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debating death: religion, Politics, and the
oregon death With dignity Act
Taylor E. Purvis
Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut
in 1994, Oregon passed the Oregon Death With Dignity Act, becoming the first state in the
nation to allow physician-assisted suicide (PAS†). This paper compares the public discus-
sion that occurred in 1994 and during the Act’s implementation in 1997 and examines these
debates in relation to health care reform under the Obama administration. i argue that the
1994 and 1997 Oregon PAS campaigns and the ensuing public debate represent the cul-
mination of a growing lack of deference to medical authority, concerns with the doctor-pa-
tient relationship, and a desire for increased patient autonomy over decisions during death.
The public debate over PAS in Oregon underscored the conflicts among competing reli-
gious, political, and personal interests. More visible and widespread than any other Ameri-
can debate on PAS, the conflict in Oregon marked the beginning of the now nationwide
problem of determining if and when a terminally ill person can choose to die.
introduction
“In his final months, Emerson lived in
agony, unable . . . to end his own suffering.
His bones became so brittle that they broke
when he turned over. He lived in constant
pain, no matter how much morphine was
prescribed. My husband of 40 years died
exactly the death he feared” [1]. 
Individual  testimonies  like  this  one,
found in a “Measure 51 Arguments in Oppo-
sition” voters’ packet published by the Ore-
gon Secretary of State Elections Division,
were crucial to the pro-physician-assisted sui-
cide campaigns in Oregon in 1994 and 1997.
In 1994, Oregon passed the Oregon Death
With Dignity Act, legalizing physician-as-
sisted suicide (PAS) for terminally ill Oregon
residents. Between the passing of the Act and
its eventual implementation in 1997, a rivalry
between socially liberal groups and conser-
vative religious organizations developed. Po-
litically liberal organizations that supported
the Act drew on public hostility against the
Catholic Church and depicted PAS as both a
right that respected individual autonomy and
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aid in dyingas a more dignified way of facing death. By
patient autonomy, I refer to what the Presi-
dent’s Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Be-
havioral Research terms “patient sovereignty”
[2] or “patient choice and control over med-
ical decisions” [3]. Religious groups in oppo-
sition to PAS presented aid-in-dying as a threat
to morality and introduced practical concerns
that clinical techniques were ineffective. 
This paper compares the public debate
that occurred in 1994 and during the Oregon
Death With Dignity Act’s eventual enactment
in 1997. The public discussion surrounding
PAS in Oregon had far-reaching implications,
and rhetoric from the campaigns would be re-
peated in discussions of national health care
reform under the Obama administration. I
argue that the 1994 and 1997 Oregon PAS
campaigns and the subsequent public debate
demonstrate a declining trust in the medical
profession, competing claims to medical ex-
pertise, and a desire for individual choice and
control during death. This public discussion
underscored the conflicts among competing
religious, political, and personal interests and
brought to the foreground questions of physi-
cian authority, dignified death, and the limits
of modern medicine.
In Dying Right, authors Daniel Hillyard
and  John  Dombrink  provide  a  thorough
overview of the 1994 and 1997 physician-as-
sisted suicide campaigns in Oregon and devote
significant space to examining the political
strategies of both sides of the campaigns [4].
The authors correctly point to a number of
themes that were ongoing in these debates, in-
cluding individual rights, religious hostility,
clinical failure, and the morality of PAS. How-
ever, Dying Right touches on these themes
only briefly; this paper seeks to provide addi-
tional evidence of the underlying tensions on
both sides of the campaign and to highlight
new aspects such as individual testimonies,
concerns over terminally ill misdiagnoses, and
grassroots activism. It will then seek to add a
more substantial analysis of the 1997 cam-
paign, which was only briefly examined in
Dying Right. This paper also argues, in con-
trast to Hillyard and Dombrink’s analysis of
the two campaigns, that the Catholic Church’s
rhetoric during the 1994 campaign was almost
entirely dominated by moral and religious ar-
guments; the Church’s strategy in 1997, in
contrast, was much more secular, emphasizing
terminally ill misdiagnoses and clinical fail-
ures over the sins of suicide. Finally, the pres-
ent relevance of the recent developments in
health care reform call for a reassessment of
the meaning and significance of the 1994 and
1997 debates surrounding PAS.  
BAckground to the oregon
deAth With dignity Act
The legalization of PAS in Oregon arose
from a growing dissatisfaction with the med-
ical profession and the development of a na-
tional “right to die” movement. The 1994
legalization of PAS in Oregon illustrated the
erosion in deference to the medical establish-
ment that fulminated in the 1960s and 1970s.
Patients had become increasingly concerned
about the distance between doctors and pa-
tients, the repercussions of modern medicine
on patient care, and the tendency for doctors
to act simply as technicians and lose sight of
the patient as a person. Americans were seek-
ing to regain control of their own bodies and
take health care into their own hands by ques-
tioning the authority of the medical profes-
sion [5].1 As historian James T. Patterson
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1For a discussion on the importance of the doctor-patient relationship and the principle of autonomy in
20th-century bioethics, see Chapter 6 of ren￩e C. Fox and Judith P. Swazey’s Observing Bioethics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). This work also contains interviews with prominent bioethicists
robert veatch, ruth Macklin, and Daniel Callahan, who describe the influence of the civil rights and
women’s liberation movement on patients’ rights, autonomy, and anti-paternalism in the 1960s and
1970s. See also Carla Messikomer, renee Fox, and Judith Swazey, “The Presence and influence of re-
ligion in American Bioethics,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 2001;44(4):491-2; Daniel Calla-
han, “Universalism and Particularism: Fighting to a Draw,” Hastings Center report, 2000;30(1):40; and
James T. Patterson, “Disease in the History of Medicine and Public Health,” in Major Problems in the
History of American Medicine and Public Health, eds. John Harley Warner and Janet A. Tighe (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001), p. 20-1.describes, “[i]n these years, the exalted, near-
priestly reputations of white-coated medical
personnel dropped precipitously” [6]. The
“right to die” sentiment developed in parallel
with this skepticism of medical authority, be-
ginning in 1967 with the creation of the first
living will that allowed patients to control de-
cisions about their end-of-life care years in
advance [7].
By the mid-1970s, every state in the na-
tion had decriminalized suicide, and a large
number of states simultaneously affirmed that
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment was not suicide. The 1976 case of
In Re Quinlan was the first to consider “right
to die” claims based on the right to privacy. In
this case, the father of a 22-year-old woman
in a persistent vegetative state petitioned the
New Jersey Supreme Court with a request to
withdraw her respirator. Concerning the de-
cision to allow withdrawal of treatment, au-
thor Raymond Whiting explains that the New
Jersey Supreme Court “elected . . . to set the
standard for all ‘right to die’ cases by basing
its decision to allow the removal of the respi-
rator on Ms. Quinlan’s right to privacy” [8].
Further legislation in the 1980s and early
1990s recognizing a right to die spurred a
sudden increase in the number of articles in
professional journals discussing this right, as
well as the formation of national right to die
organizations [9].2
In addition to the national preoccupation
with the right to die, the political and social
culture  of  the  state  of  Oregon  fostered  a
unique environment for the eventual success
of PAS legalization. Oregon has a history of
anti-authoritarian decision-making in the field
of health care. During the Progressive Era, cit-
izens of Portland led a vociferous campaign
against compulsory vaccination. Residents de-
nounced government interference in health
care and criticized the medical professionals
who touted their medical expertise as more
valid than parents’ wishes [10]. More recently,
in  1989,  Oregon  embraced  a  progressive
health care reform bill — the first of its kind
in the nation — that extended medical care to
more  lower-income  families  currently  not
covered by the state’s insurance [11-12].3Ore-
gon’s independent mindset in the field of
health care is likely rooted in the state’s early
history; as Brian Doyle of the University of
Portland, Oregon, describes, “Oregon was a
determinedly independent territory, fending
off the national claims of Britain, Russia, and
Spain, before it ever became one of the Amer-
ican States” [13]. 
Support for the right to die was espe-
cially high in Oregon, and nearly 60 percent
of Oregon citizens polled expressed support
for legalizing PAS, which would allow doc-
tors to prescribe lethal medication to termi-
nally  ill  patients  who  would  then
self-administer  it  [14].  In  1994,  a  group
known as Oregon Right to Die, along with
other euthanasia and PAS activists, proposed
a ballot initiative in Oregon — Measure 16,
or the Oregon Death with Dignity Act — that
would allow physicians to prescribe lethal
drugs to terminally ill patients who met spe-
cific clinical criteria.4 Though attempts at le-
galizing PAS had failed earlier in California
and Washington, Oregon had a distinctive po-
litical and social climate that made the legal-
ization  of  PAS  more  likely  to  succeed.5
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2Although support for the right to refuse or withdraw medical treatment had become widespread by
the 1970s, many philosophers and health care professionals remained opposed to aid-in-dying. See
Daniel Callahan, “When Self-Determination runs Amok,” Hastings Center report, 1992;22(2):52-5.
3See also Jonathan Oberlander, “rationing Medical Care: rhetoric and reality in the Oregon Health
Plan,” Canadian Medical Assication Journal, 2001;164(11):1583-7 for details of the plan and its impor-
tance for national public policy.
4For a criticism of the frequent use of the term “dignity” in bioethics, see ruth Macklin, “Dignity is a
Useless Concept,” British Medical Journal, 2003;327:1419-20.
5The initiatives that failed were Washington’s initiative 119 and the California Proposition 161, de-
feated in 1991 and 1992, respectively. See Brian Doyle, “Killing Yourself: Physician-Assisted Suicide
in Oregon,” in American Catholics, American Culture: Tradition & resistance, ed. Margaret O’Brien
Steinfels (Oxford: Sheed & Ward, 2004), p. 78.Oregon was a “unique state both in terms of
the long history of citizens using the initiative
power as a tool of legal and social change and
in terms of citizens’ defiance toward both or-
ganized religion and outside political pres-
sure” [15]. Oregon was the first U.S. state to
implement the citizen’s initiative process,
which authorized petitions signed by a mini-
mum number of Oregon voters to force a
public vote or persuade lawmakers [15-16].
Progressive Era Portland, Oregon, also has
been described as “the primary social base of
the ‘Oregon System’ of direct legislation . . .
[and] the center of the national movement for
direct democracy” [17].
the 1994 oregon deAth With
dignity Act cAmPAign
The 1994 Oregon Death with Dignity
Act, or Measure 16, was a citizens’ initiative
led by Barbara Coombs Lee, a nurse, lawyer,
and the Chief Petitioner of Measure 16, and
Dr. Peter Goodwin, a family practitioner and
professor who drafted the measure. The Act
would permit adult Oregon residents, who
had voluntarily expressed the wish to die, to
“make a written request for medication for
the purpose of ending his or her life in a hu-
mane and dignified manner” [18]. The pa-
tient’s attending physician was required to
fulfill a list of responsibilities, including the
initial determination of a terminal illness,
and had to consult a second physician to
confirm the terminal diagnosis [18].6
Coombs Lee had experience in both
nursing and law and spent much of her nurs-
ing career caring for terminally ill patients.
Dr. Goodwin was an associate professor of
family medicine at Oregon Health Sciences
University School of Medicine, Portland,
who became interested in advocating for
PAS after the deaths of several of his pa-
tients [19]. Dr. Goodwin also served as the
board director for the Hemlock Society, a
prominent right-to-die organization that pro-
moted both PAS and voluntary euthanasia
[20-21]. Together with a new group, Oregon
Right to Die, and campaign strategist Eli
Stutsman, Coombs Lee and Dr. Goodwin set
out  to  propose  a  citizens’  initiative  that
would seek to legalize physician-assisted
suicide. In both 1994 and 1997, Coombs
Lee, Stutsman, and Dr. Goodwin were the
primary figures responsible for shaping the
campaign to legalize PAS [21].
Coombs Lee, Dr. Goodwin, and Oregon
Right to Die marketed Measure 16 by ap-
pealing to Oregon citizens’ individual self-
determination, desire for choice, and patient
autonomy at the time of death.7 Dr. Good-
win emphasized that patients would be “em-
powered” by the fact that PAS legislation
would allow them more control over deci-
sions during death [22]. Other proponents
argued that patients had a right to choose the
timing and manner of their deaths when
faced with a terminal illness, rather than
having to suffer an undignified, possibly hu-
miliating, and likely painful death.8 A 1994
op-ed article from The New York Times en-
titled  “A  Rational  Right”  described  a
reader’s understanding that “[i]n a rational
democracy competent individuals should be
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6Consulting physicians were also required to refer the patient to counseling if a mental disorder was
suspected. For discussions about competency and the ability of terminally ill patients to consent to PAS,
see Linda Ganzini et al., “Evaluation of Competence to Consent to Assisted Suicide: views of Forensic
Psychiatrists,” American Journal of Psychiatry, 2000;157(4): 595-600; Margaret A. Drickamer et al.,
“Practical issues in Physician-Assisted Suicide,” Annals of internal Medicine, 1997;126(2): 147-8; and
Cameron Stewart et al., “A Test for Mental Capacity to request Assisted Suicide,” Journal of Medical
Ethics, 2011;37(1): 34-9. For an argument that suicide can never be a “rational” act, see Joseph rich-
man, “The Case against rational Suicide,” Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior, 1988;8(3):285-9.
7For a defense of PAS as upholding autonomy, see ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument
About Abortion, Euthanasia, and individual Freedom (New York: vintage Books, 1994).
8For a theological perpective on assisted suicide and the relief of suffering, see Karen Lebacqz, “re-
flection,” in On Moral Medicine: Theological Perspectives in Medical Ethics, ed. Stephen E. Lammers
and Allen verhey, 2nd ed (1998), p. 666. See also John rawls, et al., “Assisted Suicide: The Philoso-
pher’s Brief,” in Philosophy and Death: introductory readings, ed. Samantha Brennan and robert J.
Stainton (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2010), p. 331-44.in control of their own lives. . . . This logi-
cally includes the manner of dying” [23].9
The author argued that Measure 16 protected
an individual’s rights while still respecting
those of the community. Measure 16 sup-
porters tried to depict the legalization of PAS
as a right that upheld patients’ choice, con-
trol, and freedom at the end of life.
Proponents of Measure 16 also realized
the power of individual anecdotes to sway
public perception. These anecdotes added a
sympathetic, personal dimension to a proce-
dure that was often portrayed by opponents
as malicious or impersonal. Proponents used
individual testimonies from both prominent
medical professionals and patients and their
families who supported PAS. In a 1995 in-
terview with Hospitals & Health Networks,
Dr. Goodwin explained that he became a
PAS activist after witnessing the suffering of
a former patient diagnosed with pancreatic
cancer. His patient “died a horrible death,
coughing his lungs out and vomiting his life
away. It shouldn’t have to be that way” [24].
Anecdotes  had  become  a  commonly
used tool to appeal emotionally to voters.
One 60-second television ad in support of
Measure 16 featured former nurse Patty A.
Rosen of Bend, Oregon, who told her story
about seeking drugs illegally to help her
daughter die:
“I am a criminal,” Rosen says. “My
25-year  old  daughter,  Jody,  was
dying of bone cancer. The pain was
so great that she couldn’t bear to be
touched, and drugs didn’t help . . .
she decided she wanted to end her
life. . . . So I broke the law and got
her the pills necessary. And as she
slipped peacefully away, I climbed
into her bed and I took her in my
arms (Rosen’s voice cracks with
emotion)  for  the  first  time  in
months” [25].
The ad continues with Rosen urging voters
to vote “yes” on Measure 16 and to uphold
the right to die a dignified death. In actual-
ity, Rosen had revealed in a 1992 talk to the
Hemlock Society that the lethal medication
she gave to her daughter had not ensured a
clean, efficient, or “peaceful” death. Out of
fear  that  her  daughter  would  eventually
wake up, Rosen was forced to inject her with
morphine and give her a suppository to pre-
vent her from vomiting the lethal pills [25-
27]. The message portrayed on television by
Measure 16 supporters, however, was that
PAS did work, and that the procedure was
simple, dignified, and merciful. Ironically,
PAS supporters, while advocating for in-
creased patient autonomy at the end of life,
relied on the cultural authority of high-tech
medicine to claim that PAS was clean, safe,
and medically effective.10
In addition to personal anecdotes, rheto-
ric directed against religious groups and the
Catholic Church was used to persuade voters
to support PAS legalization. With only 12
percent of the Oregon population identified
as Catholic and considerable public sentiment
against religious political involvement, Meas-
ure 16 supporters knew they could draw on
hostility toward the Catholic Church to mo-
bilize their campaign efforts [28].11 Propo-
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9For a similar philosophical argument, see Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomed-
ical Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 90.
10While most physicians would use oral barbiturates, benzodiazepines, and narcotics to aid in a patient’s
death (see Margaret A. Drickamer et al., “Practical issues in Physician-Assisted Suicide,” Annals of inter-
nal Medicine, 1997;126(2):149-50), there was no true consensus among physicians as to which lethal
medications to prescribe. A 1996 study in the New England Journal of Medicine reported that 50 percent
of physicians surveyed in Oregon “were not sure what they would prescribe if they decided to comply
with a patient’s request for a lethal dose of medication.” See Melinda A. Lee et al., “Legalizing Assisted
Suicide—views of Physicians in Oregon,” New England Journal of Medicine, 1996;334(5):313.
11Brian Doyle of the University of Portland, Oregon, attributes Oregonians’ distaste for Catholicism to politi-
cal developments in the 1920s. Oregonians passed a measure in 1922 banning private education, and the
Catholic university led a tumultuous 3-year fight to overturn the law. See Brian Doyle, “Killing Yourself:
Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon,” in American Catholics, American Culture: Tradition & resistance,
ed. Margaret O’Brien Steinfels (Oxford: Sheed & Ward, 2004), pp. 77, and M. Paul Holsinger, “The Ore-
gon School Bill Controversy, 1922-1925,” Pacific Historical review, 1968;37(3):327-41.nents realized that many Oregonians were
particularly antagonistic toward the Catholic
Church during the 1994 election season be-
cause the Church had endorsed a controver-
sial measure on the same ballot as Measure
16 that would have prevented state anti-dis-
crimination  laws  protecting  homosexuals
[29]. As an article in The Christian Century
lamented, the Church’s endorsement of the
anti-gay  measure  “aroused  enough  anger
against the Catholic political machinery that
some  voters  vowed  to  vote  against  the
Church on every initiative regardless of its
own merits” [30-31]. Moreover, since Ore-
gon had only a small percentage of Catholics
in  the  state,  most  Oregon  voters  saw  the
Catholic Church’s involvement against Meas-
ure 16 as an attempt by organized religion to
impose its views on the public.12
Campaign television ads commonly at-
tacked the Catholic Church’s active role in
politics. One such ad, “Faces,” showed a se-
ries of adult faces while a voice told listen-
ers:  “I  don’t  need  any  church  playing
politics with my choices, with my life” and
“Measure 16 . . . ends . . . religious interfer-
ence in a part of our lives that is strictly per-
sonal” [32]. Other radio ads supported by
Oregon  Right  to  Die  argued  that  groups
campaigning  against  PAS  felt  a  “divine
right” to interfere with other people’s lives
and choices [33-34].
Despite the small minority of Catholic
voters in Oregon, the Catholic Church de-
cided to launch a $1.5 million campaign
against Measure 16 [32,35].13 The Church
hoped that by emphasizing the moral and
ethical problems with PAS, they could mo-
bilize Oregon voters to consider whether
Measure 16 was truly guaranteeing patients
a  “dignified  death,”  as  its  proponents
claimed. In the 1994 campaign, the Catholic
Church aggressively emphasized the moral
and  religious  problems  with  PAS  to  its
Church members.14 Although the Coalition
for Compassionate Care also sponsored sev-
eral television advertisements raising the
possibility of terminally ill misdiagnoses
and depression motivating requests for as-
sistance  in  suicide  [36],  the  Catholic
Church’s 1994 campaign against Measure
16  was  primarily  aimed  at  reminding
Catholic Oregonians of the ethical implica-
tions of PAS. 
The  Church  used  its  pulpits  to  urge
Catholics to vote against Measure 16 and
make a political contribution to the Coali-
tion for Compassionate Care [37]. For ex-
ample, Archbishop William J. Levada of the
Diocese of Portland and Bishop Thomas J.
Connolly of the Diocese of Baker urged
priests around the state to preach against
PAS on September 18, 1994, and to collect
in-pew donations the following Sunday. The
Church explained that on September 18,
Catholic churches statewide would hold a
special “Mass of Compassionate Care for
the Dying” to emphasize the sanctity of old
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12For a discussion on Catholicism in Oregon, see Brian Doyle, “Killing Yourself: Physician-Assisted
Suicide in Oregon,” in American Catholics, American Culture: Tradition & resistance, ed. Margaret
O’Brien Steinfels (Oxford: Sheed & Ward, 2004), p. 76-8.
13To clarify, by “Catholic Church” i refer to the bishops and clerical political councils that opposed the
Oregon Death With Dignity Act, such as the Northwest bishops, the California Catholic Conference,
Archbishop William Levada, and Bishop Thomas Connolly of Oregon. Oregonian lay Catholics likely
took a variety of stances on the issue. Bishops and clerical councils primarily interacted with society
through advertising campaigns (especially during the 1997 campaign), sermons denouncing PAS,
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more on the complex nature of Catholicism in Oregon during the 1994 and 1997 campaigns, see
Brian Doyle, “Killing Yourself: Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon,” in American Catholics, American
Culture: Tradition & resistance, ed. Margaret O’Brien Steinfels (Oxford: Sheed & Ward, 2004), p. 76-
101.
14For prominent Catholic theological viewpoints on assisted suicide, see St. Thomas Aquinas,
“Whether it is Lawful to Kill Oneself,” in Ethical issues in Death and Dying, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp
and robert M. veatch, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996), p. 119-21, and John Paul ii, “Eu-
thanasia,” in On Moral Medicine: Theological Perspectives in Medical Ethics, ed. Stephen E. Lam-
mers and Allen verhey, 2nd ed (Grand rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1998), p. 650-4.age, warn of the threat PAS presented to in-
nocent humans, and urge the congregation
to vote “no” on Measure 16 [35,38]. Special
church bulletin inserts that accompanied the
sermon directed attendants to make checks
out to the Coalition for Compassionate Care
the following Sunday. Archibishop Levada
and Bishop Connolly also mailed requests
for $50 donations to every Catholic house-
hold in Oregon, enclosing a letter that ex-
plained: “[a] euthanasia initiative permitting
physician-assisted suicide would cross the
moral boundary line by legalizing inten-
tional acts to end life. . . . Measure 16 is
about selling murder in the name of mercy”
[39]. Even the Vatican newspaper L’Osser-
vatore Romano urged Catholics not to sup-
port  the  Oregon  law,  since  PAS  would
“transform doctors from healers to ‘notaries
of death’” [40]. 
the 1997 effort to rePeAl
Despite the Catholic Church’s efforts
against PAS legalization, Measure 16 passed
with 51 percent of the vote. After a legal in-
junction and several court cases, the Act fi-
nally  became  law  on  October  27,  1997.
After this defeat, Catholic organizations and
Right to Life campaigners — including a
new  partner,  the  National  Right  to  Life
Committee — convinced the Oregon Med-
ical Association (OMA) to join the effort to
repeal Measure 16. The organization was
under new leadership by this time, and the
Catholic Church had successfully urged the
OMA to reconsider its earlier neutral stance
[41].  With  support  from  the  OMA,  the
Catholic Church exhorted the Oregon legis-
lature to give voters a chance to repeal the
law. In 1997, the Oregon legislature agreed
to place a measure (Measure 51) on the gen-
eral election ballot in November that would
allow voters to repeal the Act just 3 years
after the initial vote.  
Supporters of PAS, including Coombs
Lee, Dr. Goodwin, and Oregon Right to Die,
were  forced  to  mobilize  voters’  support
again to uphold the 1994 law. The campaign
against repeal of the Act was led by the same
pro-PAS groups from the 1994 campaign,
and  campaign  leaders  re-used  successful
media techniques from the 1994 campaign
such  as  individual  testimonies  and  anti-
Catholic rhetoric. For example, Measure 51
opponents featured testimony from Dorothy
Hoogstraat, the wife of a prostate cancer pa-
tient Emerson Hoogstraat:  
My husband, Emerson, had termi-
nal  cancer.  But  politicians  took
away  any  chance  he  had  to  use
measure  16.  He  died  a  horrible
death. . . . The choice about using
Measure 16 was taken away from
Emerson. Don’t let them take that
choice away from you [42].
In the “Measure 51 Arguments in Opposi-
tion” packet published by the Oregon Secre-
tary of State Elections Division, Hoogstraat
described her husband’s painful death, de-
spite increasing doses of morphine, and told
voters that Emerson could have been spared
months of agony if the Death with Dignity
Act had been available to him [1].
Once  again,  personal  testimony  was
mobilized to argue in favor of legalizing
PAS. In the third of a series of “Measure 51
Doctor-Assisted Suicide Voter’s Guide” ar-
ticles in The Oregonian, Tricia Knoll of
Portland,  Oregon,  told  readers  that  she
wished PAS had been made available to her
mother. Knoll described her mother’s wish
to commit suicide after enduring weeks of
pain from ovarian cancer and informed read-
ers that “I bitterly resent . . . that she did not
have the choice — because the choice is ex-
actly what she asked for” [43]. Individual
testimonies from surviving family members
of patients who died painful deaths high-
lighted the individual impact of PAS legis-
lation  and  played  on  voters’  possible
experiences  with  painful  or  undignified
deaths of friends or family members. 
Again, Measure 51 opponents used fa-
miliar  rhetoric  lamenting  the  role  of  the
Catholic Church and organized religion in
politics to urge voters to vote against repeal.
A television ad sponsored by the repeal op-
ponents warned that “[t]he Catholic Church
is spending a fortune to repeal Measure 16.
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rest of us” [44]. A set of radio ads sponsored
by the “Don’t Let ’Em Shove Their Religion
Down  Your  Throat  Committee”  warned
against religious politicians’ attempts to im-
pose their beliefs on the public. One Oregon
voter described to The Oregonian his disap-
proval of the Catholic Church’s political
role: “Religion is fine . . . [b]elieve what you
want to believe. But I liked the slogan of the
committee running those ads: ‘Don’t shove
your religion down my throat!’” [31,44,45].
Voters also expressed their disillusionment
with the Catholic Church and religion more
generally in the “Measure 51 Arguments in
Opposition” packet, urging other voters to
keep  religion  and  politics  separate  and
specifically to keep religious political ma-
chines  out  of  end-of-life  decisions  [46].
With the Catholic Church’s continued in-
volvement in the repeal of PAS legislation,
Measure 51 opponents used anti-Catholic
media techniques that had proven success-
ful in the 1994 PAS campaign.
Measure 51 opponents also capitalized
on an angle unique to the 1997 campaign
against repeal: harnessing voters’ anger to-
ward the legislature. Many voters were fu-
rious that the Oregon legislature would sway
to political and religious pressures and refer
Measure 16 back to the ballot when the pub-
lic had already decided on the issue 3 years
before. Polls revealed that up to 66 percent
of voters would not vote to re-elect legisla-
tors  who  mandated  second  votes  [47].
Coombs  Lee  realized  early  on  how  she
could use voters’ anger with the Oregon leg-
islature in the 1997 campaign and perhaps
motivate voters to vote “no” on the repeal
even if they had not supported PAS in 1994
[48]. One anti-51 campaign television ad
showed Dr. Glen Gordon, a former president
of the OMA, denouncing politicians’ roles
in PAS:
Sometimes my patients and their
families have to make very difficult
choices about life and death. When
we passed Measure 16, we guaran-
teed that all patients would have a
choice. But now some politicians
in Salem are making us vote on this
all  over  again.  Measure  16  has
every safeguard patients and doc-
tors could want. Now all we need
is protection: from the politicians
[49].
Coombs Lee and members of other compo-
nent groups of the anti-51 campaign also
sponsored arguments in the “Measure 51 Ar-
guments in Opposition” voters’ packet, em-
phasizing that the Oregon legislature had
ignored the will of Oregon voters.  
Oregon citizens responded strongly to
cries against the Oregon legislature’s abuse
of power. One Portland man asked readers
of The Oregonian “why have we allowed
our legislators to tell us we were mistaken
the first time and that we must vote again on
the same issue with Measure 51?” [50]. He
then went on to call the legislature a “chid-
ing parent” and accused politicians of being
“smug moralists” [50].
Leaders  of  the  Catholic  Church,  ex-
tremely pleased with the Oregon legislature’s
agreement to send the Act back to the public
for a second vote, realized early on that they
would have to steer clear of religious argu-
ments to get votes. Catholic leaders under-
stood from the anti-Catholic backlash of the
1994 campaign that they would have to stay
away from the religious and moral argu-
ments that dominated previous efforts. Aux-
iliary  Bishop  Kenneth  Steiner  told  The
Oregonian that the Catholic Church “stayed
in the background. . . . We didn’t want this
to backfire on us as it did in 1994, when they
said this is the Catholic Church, or the reli-
gious right, or religious extremists, or con-
servatives” [51]. This is not to say, however,
that  the  Church  neglected  to  remind  its
Catholic members of the religious and moral
implications of allowing PAS to continue. In
1996, the ailing Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Chicago urged Oregonians to vote against
PAS as one of his final wishes before death.
The Cardinal argued that PAS constituted a
“direct attack on innocent human life” [52].
In the same year, Cardinal O’Connor, the
Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York,
delivered warnings in his Easter Mass that
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members of society [53].15 The Church un-
derstood, however, that to convince most
Oregon voters to repeal PAS, it would have
to focus purely on the medical and clinical
problems associated with Measure 16.
To persuade Oregon voters that the Ore-
gon PAS statute was flawed, the pro-repeal
campaigners  appealed  to  recent  research
studies conducted in the Netherlands that
proponents claimed demonstrated a 25 per-
cent failure rate with PAS — a statistic that
received national attention when it was cited
in  a  New  York  Times op-ed  by  Derek
Humphry, founder of the Hemlock Society
USA [54].16 Humphry explained that the
only way the Oregon law could work clini-
cally would be if a doctor could administer
the “coup de grace” if the assisted suicide at-
tempt failed (meaning the patient vomited
up the medication, fell into a coma, or was
unable to finish taking the lethal pills).  He
told readers that a patient’s only other choice
was to suffocate him or herself with a plas-
tic  bag  to  hasten  death  [54].  Though
Humphry intended the article as an argu-
ment for extending Oregon’s law to include
euthanasia,  proponents  of  Measure  51
latched on to his statistics to prove to voters
the clinical problems with Measure 16.
Pro-repeal commercials sought to con-
vince voters of the clinical failures inherent
to PAS through television commercials and
local protests. In one television commercial
that came to be known simply as the “Billy”
ad,
a healthy-looking young man, ‘Billy,’
enter[s] a waiting room and await[s]
his doom. “Three weeks ago, Billy
was told that he had less than six
months to live. And in 15 minutes, a
doctor is going to give him a lethal
prescription — just to make sure,” the
narrator  intones.  “But  what  Billy
doesn’t know is that he won’t die
right away. He’ll choke on his own
vomit, in painful convulsions, and
linger for days” [44,47,55].
The  ad  repeated  concerns  raised  in
Humphrey’s op-ed and added graphic de-
scriptions  of  the  suffering  that  a  patient
could endure if the suicide attempt failed.
Pro-repeal Oregon voters also used dramatic
grassroots efforts to demonstrate the possi-
ble clinical failures that could result from
Measure 16. One Oregon woman and for-
mer psychologist drove a minivan through
Portland suburbs with a large plastic bag
(among other anti-PAS props). She told re-
porters “[i]f the pills worked all the time,
why is Derek Humphry telling people to buy
a turkey bag?” [44]. From efforts at the
grassroots level to statements from pro-life
doctors warning of “turkey bags and bungee
cords,” the pro-repeal campaigners used the
images and statistics indicative of PAS fail-
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15All available evidence from the Oregon PAS program since its inception in 1998 suggests that pa-
tients who choose PAS are not from marginalized social groups. A 2009 summary of the Oregon pro-
gram revealed that 98.3 percent of participants were white, 48.3 percent of participants had a
bachelor’s degree or more, and 98.7 percent of patients had some type of health insurance (see “2009
Summary of Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act,” Oregon Department of Human Services (March 2010),
available from http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/docs/year12.pdf.) These statistics suggest that
racial minorities do not tend to use PAS services and that those patients who do are educated and ar-
guably less susceptible to coercion or abuse. While the summary report did not publish the socioeco-
nomic statuses of the patients, these numbers indicate that most were from more affluent
backgrounds. One British report found that participants in the Oregon program tend to be “pragmatic,
matter-of-fact persons who have always been in control of their lives … and want to name the day …
when they are finished, when life has served them, and enough is enough” (see “Chapter 5: Overseas
Experience,” First report (Select Committee on Assisted Dying for the Terminally ill Bill, 2005), p. 163,
accessed December 2, 2010, available from http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldse-
lect/ldasdy/86/8608.htm).
16For the original study, see Groenewoud JH, et al., “Clinical Problems with the Performance of Eu-
thanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Netherlands,” New England Journal of Medicine,
2000;342: 551-6. For a criticism of Groenewoud’s findings, see Peter A. rasmussen, “Correspon-
dence: Physician Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia,” New England Journal of Medicine, 2000;343:150.  ure to convince voters that Measure 16 as it
stood did not ensure a dignified death [48].
Pro-repeal campaigners also argued that
Measure 16’s requirement that a PAS patient
be diagnosed as terminally ill was not an ad-
equate safeguard due to the possibility of
medical misdiagnoses.17In the final words of
the “Billy” advertisement, for example, the
narrator tells viewers that “Billy isn’t termi-
nal. His diagnosis was wrong” [44]. Propo-
nents of repeal used personal testimonies of
patients diagnosed as terminally ill who then
went on to live days, months, or even be-
come completely healed. In a special “Vot-
ers’ Guide” section of The Oregonian, an
Oregon woman described her father’s death
from cancer. She explained that one day dur-
ing her father’s illness, which was deemed
terminal, her father rose from the bed filled
with energy and laughter and walked into the
family room to share stories with her and
other family members. Choosing PAS, she
argued, would have denied her family those
last moments of joy with her father [43].
Pro-repeal television ads demonstrated to
viewers the risks of terminally ill misdiagnoses.
One television ad featured an Oregon woman,
Lois Riddle, and her daughter, Sarah, who told
viewers that her mother was once very ill and
now lives a full and healthy life. “Yes on 51”
campaign manager Trish Conrad explained that
the “point of the ad . . . is to show that because
doctors make mistakes, loved ones might die
unnecessarily” [55]. A second series of televi-
sion ads featured an Oregon psychiatrist who
told viewers how depression is difficult to di-
agnose in patients and that it could be chal-
lenging to conclude how much time terminally
ill patients have left to live [55].
Despite the Catholic Church’s efforts to
convince voters of the clinical failures and
risk of misdiagnosis associated with PAS,
the repeal effort was unsuccessful. Oregoni-
ans ultimately decided to uphold PAS with
60 percent of the vote [56]. Measure 51 op-
ponents had successfully mobilized voter
frustration over the Oregon legislature send-
ing the PAS measure back to the public for
a second vote. By promoting anti-politician
messages, Measure 51 opponents were able
to distract voters from the Catholic Church’s
reports of clinical failures and terminally ill
misdiagnoses accompanying PAS [57].
conclusion And outlook
The 1994 legalization of physician-as-
sisted suicide in Oregon arose from a grow-
ing lack of deference to medical authority,
emphasis on patient autonomy, and increas-
ing support of patients’ right to die. Oregon
was a prime location for the first physician-
assisted suicide law, with a progressive po-
litical history, a recent statewide health care
reform bill, and a population wary of reli-
gious political influence. During the 1994
and 1997 physician-assisted suicide cam-
paigns, organizations that supported physi-
cian-assisted  suicide  appealed  to  voters’
desires for patient choice and control and ex-
ploited anti-Catholic sentiment. Religious
organizations that opposed the Act, such as
the Catholic Church, responded by mobiliz-
ing Church members and reminding voters
of the religious and moral implications of
physician-assisted suicide.
Ultimately, the public discussion sur-
rounding the 1994 Oregon Death With Dig-
nity Act resolved very little in the ongoing
debate over how to properly balance patient
autonomy, physician authority, and dignity
at the end of life.
18 After the legalization of
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17For more on the concern about medical misdiagnosis and the difficulty of accurately diagnosing a
patient as terminally ill, see Margaret A. Drickamer et al., “Practical issues in Physician-Assisted Sui-
cide,” Annals of internal Medicine, 1997;126(2):148-9, and Melinda A. Lee et al., “Legalizing Assisted
Suicide—views of Physicians in Oregon,” New England Journal of Medicine, 1996;334(5):313, 315.
18For more on the principle of autonomy, see James F. Childress, “The Place of Autonomy in
Bioethics,” The Hastings Center report, 1990;20(1):12-17, and Tom L. Beauchamp and James F.
Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Some
philosophers argue that PAS may actually undermine personal autonomy by placing what is typically
a private event (death) in the hands of medical practitioners. See Tania Salem, “Physician-Assisted
Suicide: Promoting Autonomy—Or Medicalizing Suicide?” The Hastings Center report,
1999;29(3):33-6.physician-assisted suicide in Oregon, similar
debates took place in several U.S. states. In
2008, Washington State followed in Ore-
gon’s footsteps and legalized physician-as-
sisted suicide through a citizens’ initiative
[58]. A year later, the Montana Supreme
Court held that physician-assisted suicide
did not violate public policy and that doc-
tors who helped patients commit suicide
could not be prosecuted [58]. 
The debates present in the 1994 and
1997 campaigns served as a template for
what would eventually become a nation-
wide conflict. Concerns over physician au-
thority and the doctor-patient relationship
have continued to shape current public dis-
cussions about end-of-life care and public
health policy.19Rhetoric and themes from the
Oregon  physician-assisted  suicide  cam-
paigns would arise in discussions of national
health care reform under the Obama admin-
istration. For example, opponents of physi-
cian-assisted  suicide  criticized  the  1994
Measure 16 as “open to abuse because it . . .
leaves those without access to good health
care vulnerable to facing suicide as the least
costly treatment option” [59].20
Similarly, politicians opposed to Presi-
dent Obama’s health care reform invoked
fears of “death panels” that would cave in to
economic pressures and choose a patient’s
death rather than continuing treatment.21The
term “death panel” was first coined by Sarah
Palin on August 7, 2009, on a Facebook
posting, in which Palin criticized President
Obama’s  proposed America’s Affordable
Health Choices Act of 2009 (HR 3200):
“[t]he America I know and love is not one
in which my parents or my baby with Down
Syndrome will have to stand in front of
Obama’s ‘death panel’ so his bureaucrats
can decide . . . whether they are worthy of
health care” [60]. Palin was criticizing a sec-
tion of the Affordable Health Choices Act
that would make voluntary end-of-life care
discussions, or “advance care planning,” re-
imbursable for Medicare patients [61]. 
The Catholic clergy lauded President
Obama’s desire to provide health care cov-
erage for America’s uninsured populations
[62], but several outspoken Catholic leaders
confirmed Palin’s fear that the advanced care
planning section of the Act might “encour-
age our elderly to take their own lives rather
281 Purvis: Debating death: the Oregon death with dignity act
19For more on the doctor-patient relationship, see Thomas L. Delbanco, “Enriching the Doctor-Patient
relationship by inviting the Patient’s Perspective,” Annals of internal Medicine, 1992;116(5):414-8.
Some philosophers fear that legalizing PAS would change the role of the physician toward her pa-
tient; see Leon Kass, “Neither for Love Nor Money: Why Doctors Must Not Kill,” Public interest,
1989;94:25-46; Margaret A. Drickamer et al., “Practical issues in Physician-Assisted Suicide,” Annals
of internal Medicine, 1997;126(2):148; and Lois Snyder et al., “Physican-Assisted Suicide,” Annals of
internal Medicine, 2001;135(3):212-4. Ezekiel Emanuel and Linda Emanuel describe four models of
the doctor-patient relationship, and the shift from a paternalistic model toward an informative model,
in which “physicians are described as health care providers and patients as consumers.” See Ezekiel
Emanuel and Linda Emanuel, “Four Models of the Physician-Patient relationship,” Journal of the
American Medical Association, 1992;267(16):2223.
20Fears that assisted suicide and medical rationing could lead to abuse of the terminally ill are not
new; see richard A. McCormick, “Physician-Assisted Suicide: Flight from Compassion,” Christ Cen-
tury, 1991;108(35):1132-4.
21The 1994 and 1997 campaigns revealed a historical concern with the rationing of medical care that
had been raised as early as the 1960s. in 1962, LiFE Magazine published an article discussing a
panel at Seattle’s Swedish Hospital responsible for selecting kidney dialysis patients for a limited
number of dialysis machines. The panel, which the LiFE article terms the “Life or Death Committee,”
was forced to choose one dialysis recipient for every 50 eligible patients. As the author describes, the
panel “must decide, in the words of the ancient Hebrew prayer, ‘Who shall live and who shall die.’”
Similar fears about physicians or panels deciding when a patient should die were raised under Presi-
dent Clinton’s 1993 health care proposal by Betsy McCaughey, former lieutenant governor of New
York, the American Spectator magazine, and the Washington Times. See Shana Alexander, “They
Decide Who Lives, Who Dies,” LiFE Magazine, Nov. 9, 1962, available from
http://kidneytimes.com/article.php?id=20110304143111, and Jim rutenberg and Jackie Calmes,
“False ‘Death Panel’ rumor Has Some Familiar roots,” The New York Times, Aug. 13, 2009, ac-
cessed Nov. 25, 2011, available from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/14/health/policy/14panel.html.than somehow become a ‘drain’ on the rest of
us” [63]. Deacon Keith Fournier of the Dio-
cese of Richmond, Virginia, argued that the
section of the Act requiring end-of-life coun-
seling reimbursement was closely linked to
other sections mandating coverage for con-
traception — leaving Obama’s plan “fatally
infected with the ideology of the culture of
death  at  both  ends  of  life”  [63-64].  The
United States Conference of Catholic Bish-
ops (USCCB) reiterated its support for com-
prehensive  health  insurance,  while
reminding Congress that “we strongly op-
pose . . . inclusion of technologies that . . .
fail to uphold the sancitity and dignity of life.
No health care reform plan should compel us
or others to pay for the destruction of human
life” [65]. 
The Obama administration responded
to religious and conservative political criti-
cism with appeals to patient autonomy fa-
miliar  to  the  Oregon  physician-assisted
suicide campaigns. One professor cited by
the administration explained that “end-of-
life discussions between doctor and patient
help ensure that one gets the care one wants
. . . [and] protect patient autonomy” [66].
Physician groups, including the American
College of Physicians and the American
Academy of Family Physicians, also spoke
out in support of the regulation, emphasiz-
ing that advance care planning protected pa-
tient’s wishes at the end of life [67]. Some
physicians even used personal anecdotes to
marshal support for reimbursement of end-
of-life care discussions. In the Annals of In-
ternal Medicine, Dr. Meltem Zeytinoglu
told of his mother’s experience of making
end-of-life treatment decisions during the
final stages of terminal breast cancer. He ar-
gued that discussions early on about treat-
ment options could have made his mother’s
final moments more comfortable, and that
these  conversations  “empower  [patients]
with the information they need to make the
decisions that are best for them” [68]. De-
spite these efforts, conservative opponents
of health care reform continued to use the
phrase “death panels” after Palin cointed the
term, in what bioethicist George J. Annas
deems “a rhetorical device to block any ra-
tional discussion of either death generally
or end of life care in particular” [69]. Ulti-
mately, Obama’s Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act, a similar bill that was
eventually signed into law in 2010, left out
the advance care planning reimbursement
requirement for fear of political backlash
[70]. 
Whether the policy in question is aid-in-
dying or changes to health insurance systems,
national concerns with the doctor-patient re-
lationship, patient autonomy, medical author-
ity, and potential for patient abuse continue
to play formative roles in American discus-
sions about health care. The conflict in Ore-
gon  marked  the  beginning  of  the  now
nationwide problem of determining if and
when a terminally ill person can choose to
die.  
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